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ROTH,  Circuit Judge 
 
         The Allegheny County Patriot Party ("Party") alleges 
that two Pennsylvania election laws have prevented it from 
nominating its chosen candidate for school director, in violation 
of the Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment right of free 
association as well as its Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
protection of the laws.  The challenged laws, 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5), prevent a minor political party from 
"cross-nominating" a candidate for political office when that 
candidate has already been nominated for the same office by 
another political party.  The Party seeks declaratory and 
injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to prevent 
enforcement of the challenged Pennsylvania laws in future 
elections. 
         We hold that the challenged sections of Pennsylvania's 
election code violate the Patriot Party's right of free 
association and its right to equal protection of the laws.  The 
state election laws severely burden the Party's right to choose 
its standard-bearer and build its political organization, without 
supporting a compelling countervailing state interest.  They also 
facially discriminate against minor political parties and their 
supporters.  We will therefore reverse the judgment of the 
district court, enter judgment for the Patriot Party, and remand 
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
         The district court properly asserted subject matter 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3)-(4).  We have 
jurisdiction of the district court's final order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
                                I. 
         The facts of this case are not in dispute.  The 
Pennsylvania Election Code explicitly allows candidates for 
certain local offices, including school director, to be nominated 
by both major parties.  25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2870(f).  Pursuant to 
the Code, several candidates for school director in 
Pennsylvania's North Allegheny School District sought the 
nominations of both the Democratic and Republican parties in the 
May 1993 municipal primary.  Three candidates were nominated by 
both major parties to run in the November 1993 general election 
for the four available four-year terms.  In addition, Michael 
Eshenbaugh sought the nomination of both major parties for the 
one available two-year term.  Although Eshenbaugh was nominated 
by the Democratic Party, he lost his bid for the Republican 
nomination. 
         In July 1993, the Patriot Party of Allegheny County, a 
minor political party, see 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2831(a)-(b) and 
2872.2, nominated four candidates for school director in the 
North Allegheny School District.  Eshenbaugh was one of the 
Patriot Party nominees, and he willingly accepted his nomination 
by the Party.  Two sections of the Pennsylvania Code, however, 
voided the Patriot Party's nomination of Eshenbaugh, because he 
had already sought the nomination of the major political 
parties.  By letter dated August 10, 1993, Mark Wolosik, 
Director of the Allegheny County Department of Elections ("the 
Department"), explained that because Eshenbaugh had previously 
filed nomination petitions seeking the nominations of the major 
parties, Pennsylvania law prohibited him from filing nomination 
papers to run on a minor party ticket.  Wolosik cited 25 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 2936(e) as the authority for his ruling, without 
noting that § 2911(e)(5) also prevented Eshenbaugh's dual 
candidacy.  See supra note 1. 
         The Patriot Party challenges the constitutionality of 
25 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5) as applied in this 
case to prevent the Party from nominating Eshenbaugh.  Because 
both parties agreed that the facts were undisputed, the district 
court treated the Department's motion to dismiss and the Patriot 
Party's motion for summary judgment as cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  See Patriot Party v. Allegheny County Dep't of 
Elections & Mark Wolosik, No. 93-1884, slip op. at 2 n.1 (W.D. 
Pa. June 7, 1995) (hereinafter Patriot Party).  The district 
court denied the Patriot Party's free association and equal 
protection claims, holding that the state's legitimate interest 
in regulating its ballot justified the restraints that the 
election code placed on minor parties.  Patriot Party, slip op. 
at 11. 
         Our review of the district court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Wheeler v. Towanda Area School Dist., 950 
F.2d 128, 129 (3d Cir. 1991); Public Interest Research Group of 
N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).  We apply the 
same test the district court should have applied initially.  
Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). 
                               II. 
         Before reaching the merits of the Patriot Party's 
challenge, we must determine whether this controversy is 
justiciable.  Eshenbaugh, running on the Democratic ticket only, 
won the two-year term vacancy for school director in the November 
1993 election.  Patriot Party, slip op. at 3 n.3.  As a result, 
we must ensure that this case has not been mooted by the fact 
that the election in question has taken place and by Eshenbaugh's 
success in that election.  "An action becomes moot when '(1) 
there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged events will 
recur . . . and (2) interim relief or events have completely 
eradicated the effects of the violation.'"  Zellous v. Broadhead 
Assoc., 906 F.2d 94, 100 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Ames v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 864 F.2d 289, 291-92 (3d Cir. 
1988)). 
         Although the 1993 election has come and gone, the 
district court found that "[i]f it were permitted to do so, [the 
Patriot Party] would nominate a candidate who, like Mr. 
Eshenbaugh, has sought the nomination in the primary election by 
both major parties and who has succeeded in winning the 
nomination of one of those parties."  Patriot Party, slip op. at 
5.  Since this case was filed, the Patriot Party has also 
challenged the Department's decision to reject the Party's cross- 
nomination of a candidate who was nominated by both the 
Democratic and Republican parties.  See Patriot Party of 
Allegheny County v. Wolosik, Civ. No. 95-1175 (W.D. Pa.).  
Although this latter controversy differs from our factual 
scenario, it indicates the likelihood that cross-nominations by 
third parties will continue to vex the Pennsylvania Department of 
Elections and the courts. 
         Because cross-nominations by minor political parties 
are still prohibited by the Pennsylvania election laws, this case 
is capable of repetition, yet evading review.  Norman v. Reed, 
502 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1992) (citing Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 
814, 816 (1969)).  There is "every reason to expect the same 
parties to generate a similar, future controversy subject to 
identical time constraints . . .."  Id.  We hold therefore that 
this case is justiciable. 
                   III.  Freedom of Association 
         States have broad power to regulate the time, place, 
and manner of elections, but they must do so within the limits 
established by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.  Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 
489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989).  The protection of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments extends to partisan political organizations 
as well as to individuals.  Id. at 224 ("It is well settled that 
partisan political organizations enjoy freedom of association 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments") (citing 
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 217 
(1986); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (plurality 
opinion)).  Thus, a political party, such as the Patriot Party, 
may challenge state regulations that allegedly burden its 
fundamental constitutional right to freedom of association.  See, 
e.g., Eu, 489 U.S. 214; Tashjian, 479 U.S. 208. 
         Although no dispositive precedent explicitly discusses 
cross-nomination, a number of Supreme Court decisions touch upon 
the rights of political parties.  These cases set out a general 
framework for analyzing constitutional challenges to state 
election laws.  Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89; Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).  The Court generally 
applies a fact intensive balancing test that weighs the burden 
that the state election law places on a political party against 
the state's asserted justification for the law. 
         To determine whether a state election law violates the 
U.S. Constitution, we first examine whether the challenged law 
burdens rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  
Eu, 489 U.S. at 222.  If the law does burden protected rights, we 
must gauge the character and magnitude of the burden on the 
plaintiff and weigh it against the importance of the interests 
that the state proffers to justify the burden.  Norman, 502 U.S. 
at 288-89; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.  We examine not only the 
legitimacy and strength of the state's proffered interests, but 
the necessity of burdening the plaintiff's rights in order to 
protect those interests.  Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.  If the 
burden on the plaintiff's rights is severe, the state's interest 
must be compelling and the law must be narrowly tailored to serve 
the state's interests.  Norman, 502 U.S. at 289; Eu, 489 U.S. at 
222; see also Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 
198 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1846 (1996); Swamp 
v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383, 385 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 
U.S. 1204 (1992)).  We proceed, therefore, by first examining 
the burden that the challenged Pennsylvania election laws place 
on the Patriot Party's constitutional rights.  We then consider 
the justification that Pennsylvania has proffered to support the 
imposition of this burden. 
                 A.  Burden on the Patriot Party 
         The Patriot Party alleges that the State's prohibition 
of cross-nomination by minor parties infringes upon its First and 
Fourteenth Amendment right of free association in two ways.  
First, the restriction prevents the Party from nominating the 
standard bearer who the Party thinks will "most effectively 
advance [its] program and platform."  Second, the challenged 
election laws deprive the Patriot Party of an opportunity to 
"fuse" its votes with those of a major party and thereby to make 
inroads into the political process.  We consider these alleged 
burdens in turn. 
         An "antifusion statute" that prevents a political party 
from nominating its candidate of choice burdens a political 
party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The Supreme Court 
has recognized that "[f]reedom of association also encompasses a 
political party's decisions about the identity of, and the 
process for electing, its leaders."  Eu, 489 U.S. at 229-30 
(citing Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 
123-24 (1981) (State cannot dictate process for selecting 
delegates to national convention) and Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 
477 (1975) (State cannot dictate who may sit as convention 
delegate)).  In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. 
Comm., for example, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of 
California election laws that, inter alia, prohibited the 
governing bodies of various political parties from officially 
endorsing candidates in their own party primaries.  489 U.S. at 
216.  The Court stated that 
         [f]reedom of association means not only that an 
         individual voter has the right to associate with the 
         political party of her choice, . . . but also that a 
         political party has a right to "identify the people who 
         constitute the association," . . . and to select a 
         "standard bearer who best represents the party's 
         ideologies and preferences." 
Id. at 224 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  The Court 
recognized that the State's ban on endorsement by the party 
leadership was "clearly a restraint on the right of association,"  
id. at 225 (citing Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for 
Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981)).  It held 
therefore that because the state ban on party endorsements 
burdened free speech and free association, it could survive 
constitutional scrutiny only if it served a compelling 
governmental interest.  Id. at 225. 
         Dicta from Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticutalso 
indicates that political parties have a protected interest 
in selecting their own candidates, even if the nominee is not a 
party member.  The Court explained: 
         Were the State to . . . provide that only Party members 
         might be selected as the Party's chosen nominees for 
         public office, such a prohibition of potential 
         association with nonmembers would clearly infringe upon 
         the rights of the Party's members under the First 
         Amendment to organize with like-minded citizens in 
         support of common political goals. 
479 U.S. at 215; see also id. at 235-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("Nor is there any question of restricting the ability of the 
Party's members to select whatever candidate they desire"). 
         Like the state election laws in Eu and the hypothetical 
restriction in Tashjian, the Pennsylvania election laws prohibit 
a political party from associating with its candidate of choice.  
Eshenbaugh was the Patriot Party's chosen standard bearer, and he 
was willing to serve as the Party's candidate.  Nevertheless, 
Pennsylvania's election laws denied the Party the right to 
nominate him.  By denying the Patriot Party the right to choose 
its standard bearer, the Pennsylvania election laws burdened the 
Party's right of free association.  See Eu, 489 U.S. at 229-30 
(citing Democratic Party of the U.S., 450 U.S. at 123-24 and 
Cousins, 419 U.S. 477); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215. 
         The fact that the state election law in this case 
prevented the Patriot Party from nominating only a handful of 
candidates (those who had already sought the nomination of other 
political parties) does not necessarily lessen the burden on the 
Party's associational rights.  In order to assess this burden, we 
must look to the actual effect that the restriction will have on 
the party.  An analogy to Norman v. Reed illustrates this point.  
In Norman, the Supreme Court reviewed an Illinois decision that 
barred appellees from appearing on the ballot in a Cook County 
election as members of the Harold Washington Party ("HWP").  502 
U.S. at 282.  State law prohibited appellees from using the HWP 
name in Cook County because they had already used that name to 
establish a party in Chicago.  Id. at 286-87.  The state court 
decision, if upheld, would thus have prevented a political party 
already established in one locality from branching into other 
parts of the state under the same name. 
         The Supreme Court reversed the state court decision and 
held that the court's application of the Illinois law violated 
the HWP's First Amendment right of free association.  Id. at 290.  
Even though the statute prevented new political parties from 
using only a handful of names (those names adopted by preexisting 
parties), the Court looked to the actual effect that the 
restriction would have on the HWP.  According to the Court, the 
state court's "Draconian construction of the statute would 
obviously foreclose the development of any political party 
lacking the resources to run a statewide campaign."  Id. at 289. 
         Thus, the fact that the restriction in Norman was so 
narrowly tailored that it prevented a political party from 
choosing only the few names that had already been chosen by other 
political parties was not dispositive.  The Court looked instead 
to the effect that the law would have on the HWP's efforts to 
organize within the state.  Likewise, the fact that the 
Pennsylvania laws prevent minor political parties from choosing 
only a few candidates is not dispositive.  The critical issue, 
rather, is the effect of the laws on the ability of minor parties 
to participate meaningfully in the political process.  SeeWilliam R. 
Kirschner, Note, Fusion and the Associational Rights 
of Minor Political Parties, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 683, 699 (1995).  
As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has observed, the 
"simplistic view that the [minor party] can just pick someone 
else [to be its candidate] does not lessen the burden on the 
[minor party's] right to nominate its candidate of choice."  Twin 
Cities, 73 F.3d at 198 (citing Norman, 502 U.S. at 289).  Because 
Pennsylvania's election laws prevent the Patriot Party from 
nominating its standard bearer of choice, those laws place a 
cognizable constitutional burden on the Party's right to free 
association. 
         The Patriot Party next argues that in addition to 
nullifying its choice of candidate, Pennsylvania's statutory ban 
on cross-nomination burdens the Party's ability to build an 
effective political organization.  Although most states ban 
cross-nomination directly or indirectly, ten states, including 
New York, have a tradition of allowing minor parties to appear on 
the ballot and "fuse" votes with major parties.  See Kirschner, 
supra at 683, 685 nn.13-14.  In these states, minor parties have 
exerted considerable and sometimes decisive influence on the 
outcome of local, state, and national elections.  Id. at 683, 
700-04.  At least one historian has documented that in the late 
nineteenth century, fusion "helped to maintain a significant 
third party tradition by guaranteeing that dissenters' votes 
could be more than symbolic protest, that their leaders could 
gain office, and that their demands might be heard."  Peter H. 
Argersinger, "A Place on the Ballot":  Fusion Politics and 
Antifusion Laws, 85 Am. Hist. Rev. 287, 288-89 (1980). 
         A brief explanation of vote fusion demonstrates its 
importance to minor parties.  See Twin Cities, 73 F.3d at 197-98; 
Kirschner, supra at 687.  In the typical "winner takes all" 
election, a party's electoral success depends upon its ability to 
win the election or to contribute meaningfully to a candidate's 
victory.  Minor parties are usually unable to command sufficient 
votes to win the general election on their own.  Therefore, even 
voters who support the minor party's platform are reluctant to 
"waste" votes on minor party candidates perceived as having no 
serious chance of winning.  As the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit has observed, individuals who support a minor 
party are confronted with a no-win proposition; they may "cast 
their votes for candidates with no realistic chance of winning, 
defect from their party and vote for a major party candidate who 
does, or decline to vote at all."  Twin Cities, 73 F.3d at 199. 
         Cross-nomination allows voters to cast their vote for a 
minor party without "wasting" their vote on a candidate with no 
prospect of winning the election.  In states that allow cross- 
nomination, several parties may nominate the same candidate.  A 
voter simply casts his vote for the candidate on any one of the 
party lines.  The general election votes that the candidate 
receives on each party line are added together to determine the 
winner.  For example, if the Patriot Party had been allowed to 
cross-nominate Eshenbaugh for school director, Eshenbaugh would 
have been permitted to add the votes that he received on the 
Democratic and Patriot Party lines and count all of those votes 
toward his election (just as Pennsylvania allowed the three 
candidates nominated by both major parties to combine the votes 
they received on each major party line).  An individual casting 
his vote on the Patriot Party line could, therefore, register his 
support for the Patriot Party platform without "wasting" his vote 
on a third party candidate who stands little chance of being 
elected.  The Patriot Party notes: 
              The most vivid example of fusion's benefits for 
         minor parties occurs where a candidate is elected to 
         office as the nominee of two parties, one major and one 
         minor, and the margin of victory is smaller than the 
         number of votes the candidate received on the minor 
         party's line.  The resulting tally . . . demonstrates 
         that the minor party's support was crucial. 
Appellant's Brief at 6. 
         By thus demonstrating its electoral appeal, the minor 
party may win recognition for its policy positions as well as 
increased support from the electorate.  If significant numbers of 
voters cast ballots for a major party candidate on a minor party 
line, the candidate may infer that voters like the candidate's 
position on issues that the minor party has raised.  The more 
apparent popularity of the minor party's platform would enhance 
its standing with candidates and with voters and allow the minor 
party to compete more effectively for votes. 
         Moreover, minor political parties are not the step- 
children of the American political process.  Core First and 
Fourteenth Amendment principles protect their rights to organize 
and to compete for votes.  See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 
U.S. 23, 31-32 (1968) (noting that laws that give "established 
parties a decided advantage over any new parties struggling for 
existence" burden right to associate).  In a line of cases 
including Williams v. Rhodes, Anderson v. Celebrezze, and Norman 
v. Reed, the Supreme Court struck down statutes or practices that 
unnecessarily burdened the ability of minor political parties to 
participate in the political process. 
         In Williams, the Court reviewed state election laws 
that made it "virtually impossible for any party to qualify on 
the ballot except the Republican and Democratic Parties."  393 
U.S. at 25.  The Court found that the election laws substantially 
burdened both the right to vote and the right to associate and 
that their application only to minor parties resulted in a denial 
of equal protection of the laws.  Id. at 30-31.  In striking the 
challenged law, the Court expounded a principle that guides our 
analysis: 
         There is, of course, no reason why two parties should 
         retain a permanent monopoly on the right to have people 
         vote for or against them.  Competition in ideas and 
         governmental policies is at the core of our electoral 
         process and of the First Amendment freedoms.  New 
         parties struggling for their place must have the time 
         and opportunity to organize in order to meet reasonable 
         requirements for ballot position, just as the old 
         parties have had in the past. 
Id. at 32. 
         The principle that the political process should be open 
to new parties was vindicated again in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
460 U.S. 780 (1983).  In Anderson, a state statute threatened to 
prevent independent presidential candidate John Anderson from 
appearing on the Ohio ballot.  The statute required independent 
candidates to file nominating petitions several months before 
candidates of political parties were required to file their 
documentation.  460 U.S. at 782-83.  The Supreme Court found that 
the Ohio law effectively prevented late-emerging candidacies 
outside the major parties and burdened independent voters in the 
gathering of signatures.  Id. at 792.  The Court noted that 
         it is especially difficult for the State to justify a 
         restriction that limits political participation by an 
         identifiable political group whose members share a 
         particular viewpoint . . .. 
              A burden that falls unequally on new or small 
         political parties or on independent candidates 
         impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices 
         protected by the First Amendment.  It discriminates 
         against those candidates and--of particular importance- 
         -against those voters whose political preferences lie 
         outside the existing political parties. 
Id. at 793-94 (emphasis added) (citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 
U.S. 957 (1982)).  The Court found that the election laws 
interfered with the ability of Ohio's independent voters to 
"enhance their political effectiveness as a group" and thereby 
"threaten[ed] to reduce diversity and competition in the 
marketplace of ideas."  Id. at 794. 
         The core First Amendment principles originally 
expounded in Williams and refined in Anderson extend to this 
case.  By preventing cross-nomination and fusion, Pennsylvania's 
election laws burdened the Patriot Party's ability to choose a 
candidate and to organize and gain influence in the political 
system.  The Party was prohibited by law from associating with 
Eshenbaugh, despite the fact that Eshenbaugh was the Party's 
first choice to be its candidate.  It was also prohibited from 
forming a consensual political alliance, which would have 
eliminated the "wasted" vote problem and allowed the Party to 
demonstrate its true electoral strength.  Of course, the Party 
was still free to organize and to nominate a candidate who had 
not been nominated by another political party, but by imposing 
its election requirements, the Department undeniably burdened the 
Patriot Party's right to associate. 
         The burden imposed by the Pennsylvania election laws is 
compounded by the fact that Pennsylvania permits the two major 
parties to cross-nominate candidates.  This additional burden is 
an important distinction between this case and Twin Cities.  In 
Twin Cities, Minnesota imposed a ban on fusion by all parties.  
Thus, minor parties suffered only from the disparate impact of 
the across-the-board ban.  The ban on fusion in this case, 
however, applies to minor political parties only.  See 25 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 2870(f).  Therefore, the Pennsylvania election laws, 
unlike the Minnesota laws, discriminate on their face, as well as 
in their impact on major and minor political parties. 
         As a result of this facial discrimination against minor 
parties, the effects of the law are even more striking, with 
significant ramifications for the Patriot Party's right of free 
association.  When the major parties cross-nominate a candidate, 
as they did in the school board election, a minor party candidate 
will be required to attract enough votes on the minor party line 
alone to defeat a major party candidate who is allowed to 
aggregate the votes that he receives on both major party lines.  
Although this argument goes more directly to the Patriot Party's 
equal protection claim, see infra Part IV, Anderson reminds us 
that "a burden that falls unequally on new or small political 
parties" also impinges on associational choices protected by the 
First Amendment. 
         In defense of the statutes, the Department averred at 
oral argument that because Pennsylvania's election laws allow 
cross-filing by the major political parties in races for three 
local offices only, the restriction on cross-nomination by minor 
political parties at most imposes a minimal burden on the Patriot 
Party's free association rights.  Given the relatively minor 
status of these offices in the state political structure as a 
whole, the Department argued, any burden on the Patriot Party's 
First and Fourteenth Amendment right of free association must be 
correspondingly minor. 
         Based on our reading of Norman, we reject this 
argument.  In Norman, the Court recognized that minor political 
parties must often establish themselves at the local level, and 
it characterized as "Draconian" a state court ruling that would 
have "foreclose[d] the development of any political party lacking 
the resources to run a statewide campaign."  Norman, 502 U.S. at 
289.  Thus, the fact that an election law's effects are limited 
in scope is not dispositive.  Our inquiry focuses on the 
practical and legal barriers that the law erects for minor 
political parties seeking to establish themselves as viable 
political alternatives to the major parties. 
         The Patriot Party seeks to cross-nominate a major party 
candidate in a local election so that it can demonstrate the 
popularity of its platform in an election undiluted by the major 
parties' organizational dominance.  Like Illinois's restriction 
on using the HWP name, Pennsylvania's ban on fusion may inhibit a 
minor party's transition from fledgling political movement to 
statewide political organization.  See id.  Thus, this narrow 
application of the prohibition on cross-nomination does not 
eliminate the burden that Pennsylvania's election laws place on 
the rights of minor parties. 
         The two courts of appeals that have addressed this 
issue have split on the result.  On facts similar to those in 
this case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that laws 
preventing cross-nomination by minor parties severely burden core 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free association: 
         As in Norman, the burden here is severe because 
         Minnesota's laws keep the [minor party] from developing 
         consensual political alliances and thus broadening the 
         base of public participation in and support for its 
         activities.  History shows that minor parties have 
         played a significant role in the electoral system where 
         multiple party nomination is legal, but have no 
         meaningful influence where multiple party nomination is 
         banned. 
Twin Cities, 73 F.3d at 199 (citing Kirschner, supra at 700-04).   
As noted above, the burden on the Patriot Party's right of 
association in this case is even heavier than the burden imposed 
in Twin Cities because unlike Minnesota, Pennsylvania allows 
cross-nomination by the major parties.  See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 
793-94. 
         The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has held 
that a "ban on multiple party nominations does not burden the 
associational rights of political parties . . .."  Swamp, 950 
F.2d at 386.  The court argued that "[a]llowing minor parties to 
leech onto larger parties for support decreases real competition; 
forcing parties to chose [sic] their own candidates promotes 
competition."  Id. at 385.  Judges Ripple, Posner, and 
Easterbrook dissented from the Seventh Circuit's refusal to grant 
rehearing en banc in Swamp. 
         We note, finally, that burdens on minor political 
parties translate directly into burdens on individual voters.  
The ban on cross-nomination burdens the associational rights of a 
voter who supports a minor party platform but recognizes that his 
vote will be a political nullity unless he casts it for a major 
party candidate.  We do not believe that the First Amendment 
imposes an affirmative obligation on states to maximize support 
for minor political parties.  But in this case, a vote cast for a 
party outside the current political mainstream is burdened by 
more than the minor party's lack of political support.  The 
Pennsylvania election code has erected an artificial barrier that 
prevents a minor party from forming consensual political 
alliances, and individual supporters of the minor party 
ultimately bear the burden. 
         In light of relevant Supreme Court precedent, the 
history of fusion, and the practical effect of the challenged 
Pennsylvania laws on the Patriot Party's political development, 
we find that 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5) severely 
burden the Patriot Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
of free association.  See Twin Cities, 73 F.3d at 198-99.  
Pennsylvania, therefore, must demonstrate that these laws are 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  Norman, 
502 U.S. at 289; Eu, 489 U.S. at 222. 
     B.  Pennsylvania's Interest in Banning Cross-Nomination 
         The Supreme Court recognizes that a state has a 
"compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election 
process."  Eu, 489 U.S. at 231 (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 
410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973)). "As a practical matter," furthermore, 
"there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are 
to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than 
chaos, is to accompany the democratic process . . .."  Storer v. 
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).  To this end, states necessarily 
have adopted comprehensive election codes, id., and "the State's 
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to 
justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions."  Anderson, 
460 U.S. at 788 (footnoted omitted). 
         Wolosik and the Department of Elections argue that the 
challenged Pennsylvania election laws further four important 
state interests:  (1) preventing "sore loser" candidacies; (2) 
preventing individual candidates from "monopolizing" the ballot 
and causing voter confusion; (3) preventing a candidate from 
"bleed[ing] off votes of independent voters to bolster his or her 
major party endorsement"; and (4) encouraging new candidates to 
run as independents.  These justifications do not bear scrutiny. 
     The district court held that the challenged 
Pennsylvania laws are justified as a means to prevent "sore 
loser" candidates from carrying an intraparty squabble into the 
general election.  Patriot Party, slip op. at 9-11 (finding 
Patriot Party's argument represents "nothing more than a 'sore 
loser' situation").  "Sore losers" are candidates who lose a 
major party primary but insist on running on a minor party ticket 
in the general election.  In Storer v. Brown, the Supreme Court 
considered a California election law that denied a place on the 
general election ballot to any independent candidate who voted in 
the immediately preceding major party primary or registered 
affiliation with a political party at any time within one year 
prior to the immediately preceding primary.  Storer, 415 U.S. at 
726.  The Court upheld the restriction, noting that it works 
against independent candidates who might run against a party's 
candidate merely to vindicate their own "short-range political 
goals, pique, or personal quarrel."  Id. at 735.  Thus the 
restriction helped to prevent "splintered parties and 
unrestrained factionalism" by prohibiting unsuccessful primary 
candidates from running as independents in the general election.  
Id. at 736. 
     The district court held in this case that the 
Pennsylvania election laws, like the California election laws 
challenged in Storer, serve an important state interest in 
preventing sore loser candidacies.  We do not agree.  The 
challenged laws, as applied in this case, did not prevent a "sore 
loser" candidacy.  Eshenbaugh was nominated as the Democratic 
candidate and was going to run in the general election regardless 
of the Patriot Party nomination.  Eshenbaugh did not run merely 
as an embittered loser of the Republican primary; he was the 
Democratic Party's candidate for office.  An individual is not a 
"sore loser" when he has in fact won a major party primary and 
runs in the general election as the standard bearer for a major 
party.  If Eshenbaugh's unsuccessful quest for the Republican 
nomination had involved him in a Republican intraparty squabble, 
nothing in the Pennsylvania laws would have prevented him from 
carrying that dispute into the general election once he secured 
the Democratic nomination.  Preventing the Patriot Party from 
endorsing the major party candidate in this case could do little 
to limit factionalism and intraparty disputes in the manner 
contemplated by Storer. 
     The Pennsylvania election laws prevent sore loser 
candidacies insofar as they prevent a candidate who failed to win 
either major party primary from running as a minor party 
candidate in the general election.  The Pennsylvania laws are 
overbroad for this purpose, however, and they could easily be 
more narrowly tailored to achieve the state's asserted goal of 
averting sore loser candidacies.  When an individual runs as the 
nominee of a major party, he can hardly be accused of making the 
general election ballot a "forum for continuing intraparty feuds" 
in the manner that concerned California in Storer.  415 U.S. at 
735. 
     We note also that the sore loser justification could 
not support the sweeping ban on cross-nomination between minor 
parties that is now in place.  If an individual runs for and wins 
one minor party nomination only, the sore loser argument does not 
explain why that same individual should not be permitted to 
accept a cross-nomination from another minor party, or, for that 
matter, from a major party.  So long as the minor party candidate 
did not recently lose a primary or participate actively in 
another political party, the logic of Storer would not apply to 
the minor party candidate's acceptance of a cross-nomination by 
another major or minor party. 
     The Department also attempts to justify the contested 
election laws as a means to prevent multiple parties from 
nominating the same candidate.  The Department argues that a 
proliferation of minor parties on the ballot would confuse voters 
and clog the state's election machinery.  Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 
405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (state has legitimate interest in 
avoiding voter confusion); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 221 (same).  
But cf. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 218 (noting that administrative 
economy and convenience do not necessarily justify infringement 
of First Amendment rights). 
         As a factual matter, there is no evidence in the record 
to support the proposition that myriad small parties will "clog" 
the ballot if cross-nomination is permitted.  In Williams v. 
Rhodes, Ohio argued that election laws severely restricting minor 
party access to the ballot were necessary to prevent large 
numbers of parties from clogging the ballot and confusing voters.  
393 U.S. at 33.  The Supreme Court observed that 
         the experience of many States . . . demonstrates that 
         no more than a handful of parties attempts to qualify 
         for ballot positions even when a very low number of 
         signatures, such as 1% of the electorate, is required.  
         It is true that the existence of multitudinous 
         fragmentary groups might justify some regulatory 
         control but . . . at the present time this danger seems 
         to us no more than "theoretically imaginable."  No such 
         remote danger can justify the immediate and crippling 
         impact on the basic constitutional rights involved in 
         this case. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
         We believe that this reasoning applies here.  The 
Department has presented no evidence to indicate that fusion is 
likely to produce a crippling proliferation of minor parties.  
See Kirschner, supra at 683-85 (describing New York's successful 
experience with cross-nomination).  Furthermore, Pennsylvania 
retains the authority to set reasonable threshold requirements 
for parties seeking admission to the ballot.  See Illinois 
Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184-85 
(1979) (citing Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974) and 
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145).  In short, the Department has offered 
no evidence to indicate that the threat of "ballot clogging" in 
this case is any more real than the imaginary threat that the 
Supreme Court rejected in Williams. 
         Although cross-nomination could theoretically lead to a 
proliferation of minor parties, it might also simplify the 
election ballot and increase the amount of information available 
to voters.  First, cross-nomination might simplify voter choices 
by reducing the absolute number of candidates appearing on the 
ballot.  As more minor parties choose to cross-nominate major 
party candidates rather than field candidates of their own, the 
number of different candidates appearing on the ballot might 
actually decline.  See discussion infra (discussing Department 
argument that cross-nomination will reduce number of candidates).  
Thus, cross-nomination might actually lead to fewer candidates 
and a simpler ballot. 
         Second, if a minor party champions specific issues, 
that party's nomination of a major party candidate would signal 
to voters the minor party's belief that that candidate best 
addresses the minor party's specific concerns.  Thus, minor 
parties may provide more focused scrutiny of a candidate's 
position on issues of importance to voters.  We are chary of 
policies that restrict voter options or information in the name 
of simplicity and orderly administration.  As the Supreme Court 
said in Anderson: 
         A state's claim that it is enhancing the ability of its 
         citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the 
         flow of information to them must be viewed with some 
         skepticism.  As we observed in another First Amendment 
         context, it is often true "that the best means to that 
         end is to open the channels of communication rather 
         than to close them." 
460 U.S. at 798 (footnote omitted) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779 
(1976)); Eu, 489 U.S. at 228; Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 220-222 ("The 
State's legitimate interests in preventing voter confusion and 
providing for educated and responsible voter decisions in no 
respect 'make it necessary to burden [a Party's] rights.'") 
(quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 221-22).  We are not, therefore, 
persuaded by the Department's arguments concerning ballot 
clogging and voter confusion. 
         The other two explanations that the Department proffers 
to justify the ban on cross-nomination are even less persuasive.  
The Department argues first that the ban on cross-nomination 
prevents a candidate from "bleed[ing] off votes of independent 
voters to bolster his or her major party endorsement."  
Pennsylvania apparently is concerned that cross-nomination would 
allow major party candidates to win minor-party votes that would 
otherwise have gone to minor party candidates.  Cf. Swamp, 950 
F.2d at 386 (refusing to allow minor parties to "leech onto" 
larger parties for support for fear that practice will decrease 
real electoral competition).  This is not a question of 
candidates "bleeding off" minor-party votes, however; it is a 
voluntary transfusion of minor party support to the major party 
candidate.  Cross-nomination will not increase a major party's 
share of minor party votes unless the minor party voluntarily 
nominates the major party candidate as its own.  It is under the 
current system that major party candidates "bleed off" minor 
party votes.  When cross-nomination is prohibited, individuals 
who do not want to "waste" their votes may feel compelled to vote 
for a major party candidate--even if they support the minor 
party's platform. 
         Finally, the Department argues that "Storer and the 
Pennsylvania Election Code recognize[] a public policy of 
encouraging new candidates to run as independents and 
discourage[] a situation where one candidate could accept a major 
party nomination and several other minor party nominations 
thereby monopolizing the ballot."  The Department argues that 
cross-nomination could allow a major party candidate to reduce 
the support available for competing independent candidates by 
accepting several minor party nominations.  This hypothetical 
reduction in the support available for minor party candidates 
would presumably reduce the number of minor party candidates on 
the ballot.  This argument sets forth no compelling state 
interest, and the Department's reliance on Storer is misplaced. 
         Storer has little, if anything, to say about the 
importance of encouraging new candidates to run as independents.  
See Storer, 415 U.S. at 732 (noting states' authority to preventcandidates 
from running in general election).  The Supreme Court 
made clear in Tashjian that Storer was primarily concerned with 
protecting political parties from external threats.  Tashjian, 
479 U.S. at 224.  Storer was meant to "prevent the disruption of 
the political parties from without, and not, as in this case, to 
prevent the parties from taking internal steps affecting their 
own process for the selection of candidates."  Id.  Thus, Storeris simply 
inapposite here. 
         Furthermore, the Department has not demonstrated that a 
minor party's cross-nomination of a willing major party candidate 
would threaten to disrupt political parties in any way.  A minor 
party need not nominate a major party candidate and a major party 
candidate need not accept the nomination.  See discussion, supranote 4.  
The availability of cross-nomination as an option would 
not prevent minor parties from nominating and supporting their 
own distinct candidates if they chose to do so.  Pennsylvania has 
not demonstrated how the possibility of a consensual political 
alliance would threaten political parties from without or 
otherwise implicate the concerns outlined in Storer.  As we 
explained, supra, this is not a "sore loser" situation. 
         The Department's argument is also undermined by the 
fact that Pennsylvania permits major parties to cross-nominate 
candidates.  If the Commonwealth bans cross-nomination by minor 
parties to encourage new candidates to run for office, it should 
logically prohibit cross-nomination by major parties for the same 
reason.  An across-the-board ban on cross-nomination would 
require the major parties to nominate their own candidates, thus 
increasing the number of candidates in the field and the level of 
electoral competition.  The Commonwealth has offered no reason 
for this distinction between major and minor parties. 
         We therefore find unpersuasive each interest that the 
Department has offered to justify its ban on cross-nomination by 
minor parties.  The Department bears the burden of demonstrating 
that the challenged election laws are narrowly tailored to 
protect a compelling state interest.  Because a more narrowly 
tailored law would prevent sore-loser candidacies, this case 
falls outside the ambit of Storer.  The Department's other 
asserted interests are either unsupported by the record or 
insufficient to justify an outright ban on cross-nomination by 
minor parties.  State regulation of cross-nomination might be 
appropriate in some circumstances, but the Department has not 
carried its burden in this case.  Thus, we hold that 
Pennsylvania's prohibition of cross-nomination by minor political 
parties violates the Patriot Party's right of free association. 
               IV.  Equal Protection of the Laws 
         The Pennsylvania election code facially discriminates 
between major and minor parties.  The challenged statutes, 25 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5), operate to prevent cross- 
nomination by minor parties, while 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2870(f) 
allows the major parties to cross-nominate candidates for school 
director and other local offices.  The Patriot Party alleges that 
this disparate treatment also violates the Party's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws because it 
violates a non-discrimination principle enunciated by the Supreme 
Court in Williams v. Rhodes.  See 393 U.S. at 32.  Because 
neither Twin Cities nor Swamp involved a ban on cross-nomination 
that facially discriminated against minor parties, we examine for 
the first time in a fusion case the issues presented by the 
Patriot Party's equal protection claim. 
         The district court held that Pennsylvania's election 
laws do not violate the Patriot Party's right to equal 
protection.  Patriot Party, slip op. at 11.  The court, applying 
the same balancing test that it applied to the free association 
claim, concluded that the "defendants' legitimate interest in 
regulating [the] ballot and election process justifies the 
limited restraints placed upon plaintiff by the challenged 
provisions of the Election Code."  Id.  Appellees assert that the 
laws should be subject to rational basis review because they do 
not create an "invidious, arbitrary, or irrational" 
classification and do not apply to a suspect class.  They argue 
that because the classification is rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest in regulating its ballot, it does 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
         The Supreme Court's major precedent concerning the 
equal protection rights of political parties is Williams v. 
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 33 (1968).  In Williams, Ohio election laws made 
it virtually impossible for new or small political parties to be 
placed on the state ballot for the selection of presidential and 
vice presidential candidates.  Id. at 24.  Thus, the challenged 
laws violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection 
because they "[gave] the two old, established parties a decided 
advantage over any new parties struggling for existence and . . . 
place[d] substantially unequal burdens on both the right to vote 
and the right to associate."  Id. 
         The Court characterized the nature of the equal 
protection burden imposed by the Ohio laws from the perspective 
of both voters and minor political parties.  First, the Court 
noted that the election laws placed an unequal burden on voters 
who supported new or small political parties because those voters 
could not cast an effective vote for their party of choice.  Id.at 31.  
Second, the election laws placed an unequal burden on 
minor political parties themselves because they were excluded 
from the ballot and thereby denied an equal opportunity to win 
votes.  Id.  The State election laws burdened protected 
constitutional rights because they operated to "stifle the growth 
of . . . new parties working to increase their strength from year 
to year."  Id. at 32. 
         Against these burdens, the Court weighed Ohio's 
arguments in favor of its election laws.  The State argued that 
its laws were necessary to promote the stability and integrity of 
the political system and for administrative efficiency.  The 
Court examined each of the State's asserted interests in turn, 
and concluded that although states have broad powers to regulate 
voting, Ohio's laws constituted "an invidious discrimination" in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 31-34. 
         From Williams, we can extrapolate the first principles 
and basic structure of our equal protection analysis.  It is 
clear that no State may pass a law regulating elections that 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection 
of the laws.  Williams, 393 U.S. at 29.  Of course, "the Equal 
Protection Clause does not make every minor difference in the 
application of laws to different groups a violation of our 
Constitution," id. at 30, but we will examine election laws to 
ensure that the distinctions or classifications that they create 
are not "invidious" under our precedent.  Id.; Patriot Party of 
Pennsylvania v. Mitchell, 826 F. Supp. 926 (E.D.Pa. 1993) (citing 
Clements, 457 U.S. at 967), aff'd, 9 F.3d 1540 (3d Cir. 1993). 
         In order to determine whether election laws violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, we must measure the totality of the 
burden that the laws place on the voting and associational rights 
of political parties and individual voters against the 
justifications that the State offers to support the law.  
Williams, 393 U.S. at 34.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
Williams: "In determining whether or not a state law violates the 
Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and 
circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State 
claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are 
disadvantaged by the classification."  Id. at 30 (footnote 
omitted).  Thus, our analysis of the Patriot Party's equal 
protection claim is similar in many respects to the balancing 
test that we applied to its free association claim.   
         It is undisputed that the Pennsylvania election laws 
treat major and minor parties differently.  Major parties that 
file nominating petitions and hold primaries are permitted to 
cross-nominate each other's candidates for school board, see 25 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2870(f), while minor parties may not cross- 
nominate any candidates, see 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2936(e) and 
2911(e)(5). 
         The restriction in Williams, which prevented minor 
parties from appearing on the ballot, was undoubtedly a more 
severe burden on the rights of minor parties than the restriction 
imposed by the state election laws in this case.  The 
Pennsylvania laws do not prevent minor parties from nominating 
most individuals or from placing their candidate on the ballot; 
they merely prevent minor parties from nominating the few 
candidates already nominated by other parties.  But seediscussion supra at 
__ (discussing Norman v. Reed) [Typescript at 
14-15]. 
         Nevertheless, we believe that Pennsylvania's decision 
to ban cross-nomination by minor parties and to allow cross- 
nomination by major parties constitutes the type of "invidious 
discrimination" prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Pennsylvania's decision to ban some consensual political 
alliances and not others burdens individuals who support a minor 
party's platform because it forces them to choose among three 
unsatisfactory alternatives:  "wasting" a vote on a minor party 
candidate with little chance of winning, voting for a second- 
choice major party candidate, and not voting at all.  This burden 
would be assuaged if minor political parties were accorded an 
equal right to cross-nominate willing major party candidates. 
         The ban on cross-nomination by minor political parties 
also infringes on the the equal protection rights of political 
parties themselves.  The challenged election laws may prohibit a 
minor party from nominating its best candidate and from forming a 
critical type of consensual political alliance that would help it 
to build support in the community.  Thus, the challenged laws 
help to entrench the decided organizational advantage that the 
major parties hold over new parties struggling for existence. 
         The ill effects of these laws are further magnified 
when the major parties elect to cross-nominate the same 
candidate, as they did in the school board election at issue.  
When the major parties cross-nominate a candidate, a minor party 
candidate must fight an uphill election battle against the 
combined strength of two well-organized and established major 
parties without even the prospect of forming its own ballot 
alliances.  If a vote is "wasted" when it is cast for a minor 
party candidate running against two major party candidates, it is 
a fortiori wasted when the major parties unite behind one 
candidate.  Such an arrangement is a significant burden on a 
minor party's right to equal protection of the laws. 
         Moreover, Pennsylvania imposes these unequal burdens on 
the right to vote and the right to associate without protecting 
any significant countervailing state interest.  As already noted, 
the ban on cross-nomination by minor parties is overly broad if 
it is intended merely to prevent sore loser candidacies.  The 
other interests asserted by the Department on behalf of the 
Commonwealth simply do not bear scrutiny.  See discussion supraat ___-___ 
[Typescript at 26-36].  Furthermore, many of the 
Department's arguments concerning ballot transparency and voter 
choice are undermined by the fact that the Commonwealth allows 
cross-nomination by the major political parties. 
         Pennsylvania's election laws facially discriminate 
against minor political parties in a way that diminishes their 
ability to organize and to compete effectively in the political 
process.  The Department offers no compelling justification for 
the Commonwealth's facially discriminatory laws.  We hold, 
therefore, that these facially discriminatory laws create an 
"invidious classification" that violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
                          V.  Conclusion 
         The challenged election laws burden the Patriot Party's 
right of free association by preventing the Party from nominating 
the candidate of its choice.  They also prevent the Party from 
fusing its votes with those of the major parties in order to 
maximize its appeal to voters and to build its political 
organization.  Appellees assert no compelling state interest to 
justify the election laws as applied in this case, and 
Pennsylvania could easily achieve its asserted goal of preventing 
"sore-loser" candidacies with a more narrowly tailored law.  
Pennsylvania's ban on cross-nomination by minor political parties 
therefore violates the Patriot Party's First and Fourteenth 
Amendment right of free association. 
         The laws also violate the Fourteenth Amendment's 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.  They discriminate 
against minor parties and the voters who wish to support them 
without supporting a compelling or even a significant state 
interest. 
         We therefore hold that the challenged Pennsylvania 
election laws, as applied in this case, constitute an 
unconstitutional burden on the Patriot Party's First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to free association and equal 
protection.  We will therefore reverse the judgment of the 
district court, enter judgment for the Allegheny County Patriot 
Party, and remand the case to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
         I respectfully dissent.  As the majority indicates, 
this appeal involves a challenge to Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, §§ 
2936(e) and 2911(e)(5) (1994) "as applied in this case to prevent 
the [Patriot] Party from nominating [Michael] Eshenbaugh" as a 
candidate for school director in the North Allegheny School 
District.  Typescript at 5.  Eshenbaugh cross-filed for the 
office in both the Democratic and Republican primaries.  He won 
the first but lost the second.  Thus, at the time that the 
Patriot Party as a minor party attempted to nominate Eshenbaugh 
as its candidate, he already was the Democratic candidate.  
Everyone agrees that the nomination was thus unlawful under 
Pennsylvania law as written. 
         The majority invalidates the statutory bars to 
Eshenbaugh's nomination on First and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds.  It finds that the statutes "severely burden the Patriot 
Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free 
association."  Typescript at 24.  It also finds that the statutes 
"facially discriminate[] between major and minor parties" in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because they preclude a minor party from participating 
in the cross-nomination of a candidate while allowing major 
parties to do so.  Typescript at 34. 
         The majority does not suggest that these First and 
Fourteenth Amendment problems require the invalidation of the 
statutes at issue without further analysis.  Quite to the 
contrary, it balances the minor party's constitutional rights 
with the state's interests in precluding the cross-party 
candidacy in question here.  It then finds that the state's 
interests do not justify the restrictions, and it thus "hold[s] 
that the challenged Pennsylvania election laws, as applied in 
this case, constitute an unconstitutional burden on the Patriot 
Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free association 
and equal protection."  Typescript at 40. 
         I believe that the methodology used by the majority in 
its well-drafted and thoughtful opinion is correct.  I dissent, 
however, because I believe that, as applied in this case, the 
statutes serve a compelling state interest.  While the majority 
expresses concern that the Patriot Party's rights be protected, 
it acknowledges that it must consider countervailing interests.  
Under the Pennsylvania scheme, a voter in a primary election in 
which cross-filing is permitted, will know whether a candidate 
has cross-filed or at least that information will be available to 
the voter.  Thus, the voters in the primary knew or could have 
known that Eshenbaugh was seeking both the Democratic and 
Republican nominations.  That information could be very important 
to a particular voter, as many voters are partisan advocates of 
one or the other major political parties and only will vote for 
candidates from that party.  Of course, voters have every right 
to that partisan approach.  A voter in a primary may refuse to 
vote for a candidate who has cross-filed with another major 
party, choosing instead to vote for a "pure" Democrat or 
Republican.   
         To the partisan political voter, it might come as a 
shock to discover that he or she voted for a closet advocate of a 
minor political party.  In short, while some people see merit in 
fusion tickets, others may be put off by them.  I, of course, 
express no opinion on this political point.  I, however, do 
express the opinion that the state has a compelling interest in 
ensuring that voters in primary elections not be deceived in the 
electoral process.  In this case, a voter in the primary election 
in May 1993 for school director knew or could have known that 
Eshenbaugh was seeking to run as a Democrat and as a Republican 
and the voter could take or leave Eshenbaugh on that basis.  If 
the statutes at issue in this case had been invalidated before 
the primary, what the voter could not also have known was that a 
vote for Eshenbaugh also would be a vote for the candidate of the 
Patriot Party.  The majority sees merit in "increas[ing] the 
amount of information available to voters," typescript at 29, and 
so do I.  The problem with the majority's approach is that it 
deprives the voter of the crucial information of knowing the 
identity of the political parties with which a candidate has an 
affinity. 
         The point I raise should not be shrugged off.  Today we 
have single-issue political parties.  A Democrat or Republican 
voter might be opposed completely to the ideology of a minor 
party but yet discover after the primary that his or her vote has 
contributed to the fortunes of the minor party by nominating its 
candidate to run as a Democrat or Republican as well.  The 
Pennsylvania statutes preclude such stealth situations.  The 
majority demonstrates its concern that a minor party be able to 
"build its political organization."  Typescript at 3, 14.  What 
it overlooks is that a partisan major party voter may not want 
his or her vote used to help the minor party in that effort.   
         I recognize that it reasonably could be argued that 
Pennsylvania could avoid the problem I identify by requiring  
minor parties to select their candidates prior to the primary 
election.  Of course, such a condition would restrict the minor 
party's flexibility and would have problems of its own.  In any 
event, the possibility that a minor party could designate its 
candidate before the major party primary election does not affect 
my analysis.  Rather, I take this case as it has been presented 
by the parties to this appeal and on the basis on which the 
majority decides it, which is whether the Pennsylvania statutes 
are unconstitutional "as applied in this case."  Thus, I do not 
address the possibility that the Pennsylvania statutes might be 
unconstitutional if applied in a situation in which the minor 
party files its nominating papers before the primary for, even if 
they would be unconstitutional in that circumstance, they validly 
can be applied here.  See Commonwealth v. The First School, 370 
A.2d 702, 705-07 (Pa. 1977).  Here the Patriot Party nominated 
Eshenbaugh after the primary, and he accepted its nomination at 
that time, and both the district court and the majority 
adjudicated the case on that basis and so do I.   
         I make one final point.  I infer from the majority 
opinion that it believes that the result it reaches is dependent 
upon the circumstance that Pennsylvania permits major party 
cross-filing in school director elections.  Certainly my 
inference is correct at least with respect to the majority's 
equal protection holding, as the majority identifies the 
disparate treatment of a minor as opposed to a major party in the 
statutory scheme that permits candidates to cross-file in major 
party primaries but not to file as both a major and minor party 
candidate. 
         Nevertheless, I do not see how the application of the 
free association rights the majority identifies can be cabined to 
elections in which the state permits some cross-filing.  To the 
contrary, it seems logical to me that the majority's approach 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that Pennsylvania (and the 
other jurisdictions in this circuit) must permit cross-filing in 
all elections, so that following any primary election for any 
office, a minor party may nominate any willing major party 
candidate to be the minor party's candidate in that election.  
After all, why are the associational rights of the minor parties 
in any way dependent on the circumstance that a candidate could 
cross-file in the Democratic and Republican primaries? 
         For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.  In 
my view, the Pennsylvania statutes as applied in this case are 
constitutional.  Furthermore, I believe that the majority opinion 
carries implications which could bring about fundamental changes 
in the election processes in Pennsylvania and the other 
jurisdictions in this circuit by judicial decision.  We ought not 
to lay the foundation for such a development.  If such changes 
are to come, let the legislatures bring them about. 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
